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I. Introduction
Whether or not government deficit and debt are sustainable if continued at the present
rate (i.e., if government budget is balanced in present-value terms) is an important
policy issue. Compliance of intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) implies that
government is not resorting to ponzi schemes i.e., systematic financing of maturing
old debt by issuing new one. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is perhaps one of the earliest
attempts to derive and test for the government’s IBC. Using annual data spanning
1962-1984, they report that US government finances satisfied the IBC. Subsequently,
a voluminous literature mainly examining the US public finances has evolved;
however studies on other economies are sparse.
The emergence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has brought this issue into
focus. The European Council takes the view that ‘sound’ government finances are
vital for ‘price stability’ and ‘strong sustainable growth’1. In order to bolster fiscal
discipline across member states and contain the levels of deficit within sustainable
bounds, the European Council has adopted stringent fiscal rules. These rules,
contained in the Stability and Growth Pact, set the maximum limits of deficit (3% of
GDP) and debt (60% of GDP) and are mandatory to all member states2. The European
Council reserves the right to impose fines should a member state exceed the deficit
limit; the severity of fines is positively linked to the degree of violation of the limit.
The rationale and the potency of these fiscal rules have been extensively debated
elsewhere and we do not intend to do that here3. Instead, our aim is to re-examine the
fiscal sustainability of four Euro-zone countries (viz., Greece, Ireland, Italy and the
Netherlands) whose government finances were dubbed unsustainable in 1991, the year
of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.
Corsetti and Roubini (1991), analyzing annual data spanning 1970-1989, reported that
the government finances of these four countries were unsustainable.4 A decade has
since elapsed; the Euro has become a reality. Whilst these countries had satisfied the
                                                          
1 See Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam 17th June 1997.
2 These rules are also well-known as Maastricht criteria for fiscal convergence.
3 See, among others, Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) and
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998).
4 Corsetti and Roubini (1991) also found Belgium, amongst others, to be on an unsustainable fiscal
path. Unfortunately, we had to drop Belgium from our analysis due to the lack of consistent data.
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3% deficit criteria by 1997/1998 (see Arestis, Khan and Luintel, 2002), dissenting
voices abound. It is alleged that many euro-zone countries achieved the budget deficit
criteria through various ‘fudges’ and ‘creative’ accounting 5. Moreover, the issue of
sustainability remains. The satisfaction of the 3% deficit criterion is not equivalent to
the satisfaction of the IBC. A continuum of budget deficit of the order of 3% of GDP
would always satisfy the Maastricht criteria but that would not necessarily satisfy the
present value criteria, for the discounted debt term would not converge to zero in the
limit (see section II). Countries with positive levels of debt at time t must run future
surpluses in order to satisfy the IBC.  Hence, the findings of Corsetti and Roubini,
made more than a decade ago, act as important benchmarks in inquiring if the
government finances of these euro-zone countries have now become sustainable. In a
nutshell, the political establishment of EMU anticipates such a shift towards
sustainability following the achievement of 3% deficit criteria. Our first motivation is
to formally investigate whether this has indeed been the case.
The second motivation relates to the analysis of Corsetti and Roubini (1991) itself.
They acknowledge that the validity of their results depends on the absence of
structural breaks in the processes (i.e., the relevant measures of debt used).  However,
they were unable to address this issue because the econometric methods, at the time,
were not developed to handle the tests of structural breaks involving nonstationary
data (Corsetti and Roubini, 1991; p. 362). In fact, all influential work in this field -
Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Wilcox (1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Ahmed and
Rogers (1995), Quintos (1995) and Bohn (1998) - emphasize that structural breaks
must be accounted for while testing the IBC. For example, Ahmed and Rogers (1995)
motivate their paper precisely on the issue of structural shifts arguing that structural
stability is vital for agents to continue to believe in the solvency of government
finances.
We explicitly model structural shifts while testing the present value criteria, an issue
which has not been addressed before for this set of euro zone countries.6 Ahmed and
                                                          
5 Some examples of such ‘devices’ and ‘creative’ accounting pointed out are: the sale of Belgium Gold
Reserves, French one-off transfer of ‘France Telecom’ pension fund to public sector, Italy’s euro-tax
etc. For details see Dafflon and Rossi (1998) and Arestis et al. (2001).
6Makrydakis et al. (1999) examine the sustainability of Greek fiscal policy by allowing one-time
(endogenously determined) structural break. They find one structural shift in the Greek discounted debt
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Rogers determine break dates exogenously; we improve on their methodology by
determining multiple breaks endogenously. It is now recognized that break dates must
be identified endogenously (see Christiano, 1992; Perron, 1997).  Moreover, in the
light of recent literature (see Quintos, 1995), the tests implemented by Corsetti and
Roubini (1991) are strong form tests of fiscal sustainability, which are not strictly
required for the present value criterion to hold. We elaborate on these issues and
perform both strong- and weak-form tests of sustainability. Thus, the main
contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, it provides new insights into the fiscal
sustainability of these countries based on extended data and a new econometric
approach. Second, it establishes whether the findings of Corsetti and Roubini (1991)
are sensitive to regime (structural) shifts and /or the forms of the tests (strong versus
weak) employed.
Our results are distinct and interesting. First, we find evidence of multiple structural
breaks in the path of public finances. Of the four countries analyzed, three show as
many as four structural shifts. This casts doubt on studies that do not address
structural breaks (e.g. Corsetti and Roubini, 1991) and / or allow for only one break
(e.g., Makrydakis et al., 1999). Second, in sharp contrast to Corsetti and Roubini
(1991), we find all sample countries to be on a sustainable fiscal path. This holds even
before 1990 and even without considering the structural shifts. Corsetti and Roubini
(1991) implemented strong form tests of sustainability, which entail more stringent
conditions than those required for the IBC to hold.  Most of our results satisfy weak
form sustainability which is consistent with the IBC. We are able to reconcile our
results with those of Corsetti and Roubini (see section VII). Finally, we find a clear
Maastricht effect which is conducive to fiscal sustainability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II presents the analytical
framework; section III reviews the relevant literature; section IV describes data;
section V discusses econometric method; section VI presents empirical results; and
section VII summarizes and concludes.
                                                                                                                                                                     
and conclude that government IBC is not satisfied. We improve on their methodology by allowing for
and identifying multiple structural breaks.
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II. Analytical Framework
We express the dynamic budget constraint following Trehan and Walsh (1991). The
one-period government budget constraint is given by:
bt+1 = (1+r)bt + gt – τt –st (1)
where r is the real interest rate, gt is real government expenditure net of interest, τt is
real tax revenues, st is real revenue from seignorage (defined as changes in the real
stock of base money). Note that the net-of-interest deficit is dt = gt-τt -st. Since (1)
holds for every period, taking expectation of (1) and solving for bt by recursive
forward substitution yields:
( 1) ( 1)
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(1 ) ( ) lim (1 )J Jt t t j t j t j t t jj jb r g s r bτ
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+ + + + +
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where, tΕ  denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information
set at time t. Equation (2) is the standard intertemporal government budget constraint
in expected value terms. It states that the outstanding stock of debt, bt, equals the sum
of the present values of (i) the flow primary surpluses and (ii) the stock of debt in the
limit. The IBC requires that the limit term (bubble-term) in (2) be equal to zero (i.e.,
( 1)
1lim (1 ) 0
J
t t jj
r b− + + +
→∞
Ε + = ) asymptotically. Thus, the government cannot leave a debt
that has a positive expected present value in the limit; that would imply resorting to
ponzi schemes i.e., bubble financing of government expenditures. The governments
need to run future surpluses equal, in expected present value terms, to its current
outstanding debt. A negative expected present value of debt in the limit implies
supersolvency, i.e., asymptotically government is the net creditor to some other
sector. However, the latter can be precluded on the grounds that no other country or
sector is allowed to run ponzi schemes against the government (Ahmed and Rogers,
1995, p. 356).
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III. Related Literature
Empirical tests of IBC can be crudely grouped in terms of (i) their treatment of the
real interest rate (r), and (ii) the test approaches they follow. Some treat real interest
rate as constant whereas others treat it as stochastic. Unit root and /or co-integration
appear to be the main forms of tests followed, although some studies directly test for
the sign and the significance of the bubble term in (2). Hamilton and Flavin (1986)
assume constant real interest rate and argue that the stationarity of primary surplus
and/or the market value of debt, in real terms, is sufficient to deduce that the bubble
term in (2) is asymptotically zero. They found US primary surplus and debt to be
stationary and conclude that US government satisfied the IBC. However, Kremers
(1988) and Wilcox (1989) show that Hamilton and Flavin’s unit root tests suffer from
the problem of serial correlation in residuals; once serial correlation is accounted for
the findings of stationarity are reversed and US primary surplus and debt become non-
stationary. Similarly, Haug (1991), using finite sample critical values, also refutes
Hamilton and Flavin’s findings7.
Trehan and Walsh (1988) also assume constant real interest rate and show that the
stationarity of deficit inclusive of interest payments and seignorage is necessary and
sufficient for IBC to hold. This condition can be re-parameterized as a cointegrating
vector of the form (1 –1 –1) between g (interest-cum-government expenditure), τ (tax
receipts), and s (seignorage). According to Trehan and Walsh (1988), the stationarity
of net of interest surplus, the measure used by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), is neither
a necessary nor sufficient indicator of IBC under the assumption of constant real rate.
Using US data spanning 1890-1986, Trehan and Walsh find deficit inclusive of
interest to be stationary which supports sustainability. Unit root and co-integration
tests indicate conflicting results, which they attribute to the non-constancy of real
interest rate. Wilcox (1989) extends the Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) analysis by
allowing stochastic violations of borrowing constraints and stochastic real interest
rates. He finds US discounted debt to be non-stationary and concludes that US debt is
unsustainable; he also reports evidence of parameter instability.
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Hakkio and Rush (1991), Trehan and Walsh (1991), Haug (1991), Ahmed and Rogers
(1995) and Quintos (1995), on the other hand, employ co-integration tests. A typical
cointegrating regression is:
Rt = α + βGt + et (3)
where Rt is government revenue (inclusive of seignorage) and Gt is total government
spending on goods and services, transfer payments, and interest on debt, both
measured in real terms. Hakkio and Rush (1991) assume stochastic real interest rate
and show that if Rt and Gt are both unit root processes, I(1), then a co-integrating
relation between the two is a necessary condition for the government budget
constraints to hold. However, the co-integrating vector between Rt and Gt must be
homogenous of degree one [1 –1] in order to rule out infinite per capita debt in the
limit. Using data from 1950(2) to 1988(4) they find co-integration between real
revenue and expenditure with β <1. However, the evidence of a cointegrating
relationship disappears in sub-sample analyses which prompt them to conclude that,
in recent years, US fiscal deficit has become unsustainable.
Trehan and Walsh (1991) extend their (1988) work by relaxing the constancy of real
interest rate and show that the stationarity of inclusive-of-interest deficit is a sufficient
condition for IBC to hold. This is equivalent to the relationship (3) with a
cointegrating vector [1, 0, -1]. They show that as long as real interest rate is non-
constant, the solvency tests do not depend on the individual time series properties of
government revenue and expenditure (i.e., Rt and Gt may be integrated of different
orders)8. Further, if the net-of-interest deficit and debt are both I(1), then the
stationarity of inclusive-of-interest deficit implies solvency irrespective of whether
real interest rate is constant or not. Using data from 1890 to 1996 they conclude: (i)
US deficit conforms to IBC, and (ii) the real interest rate is variable. Ahmed and
Rogers (1995) emphasize the stability of the co-integrating relationship between Gt
and Rt. Using time series data from the UK and the US, which stretched as far back as
                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) also directly test for the significance of bubble term and report results
conducive to the sustainability of US public finances.
8 However, the order of integration is important as long as real interest rates are assumed constant; in
this case both must be I(1).
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two to three centuries, they find the cointegrating vector to be structurally stable. It is
important to note, however, that they chose the break dates exogenously.
Quintos (1995) derives strong and weak conditions of sustainability tests. Her
approach is fairly general in that it nests Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Hakkio and
Rush (1991), Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Ahmed and Rogers (1995). In view of its
generality we follow the approach taken by Quintos (1995). Sustainability conditions
are as follows: (i) if 0<β<1 in equation (3) then the IBC is satisfied in the weak sense
irrespective of whether Rt and Gt are cointegrated or not; (ii) if β=1 and Rt and Gt are
non-cointegrated then that also implies weak form sustainability; (iii) a cointegrated
Rt and Gt with β =1 implies strong form sustainability; and (iv) β=0 implies
unsustainable fiscal policy. The strong form sustainability corresponds to Hamiltan
and Flavin’s (1986) and Corsetti and Roubini’s (1991) requirement; for ∆b is
stationary if and only if β=1 and Rt and Gt are cointegrated. When deficits are weakly
sustainable, the bubble term converges to zero at a slower rate than when they are
strong form sustainable. Further, under weak form sustainability, the bubble term
converges to zero more rapidly when Rt and Gt are cointegrated than when they are
not. Although weak form sustainability is sufficient for the bubble term to go to zero
in the limit, the deficit process and undiscounted debt may be mildly explosive. The
latter may have serious policy implication as the government may have difficulty in
marketing its debt. Hakkio and Rush make this point in terms of infinite per capita
debt. Quintos examines the IBC for the US using a dataset spanning 1947(2) –
1992(3). She endogenously identifies structural shift in US fiscal path in the early
1980s and shows that the US government finances were weak form sustainable
despite non-integration between Rt and Gt beyond 1980.
IV. Data
We use time series on public expenditure (G) and public revenue (R) extracted from
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Public revenue is defined to include
seignorage, which is proxied by the change in monetary base (M0) in real terms. The
data frequency is quarterly and covers a period of 1970(1)-1998(3) for Greece,
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1962(2)-1997(4) for Italy, and 1957(1)-1998(4) for Ireland and the Netherlands.9  The
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to deflate the nominal series. Ideally, we would
have liked to use the GDP deflator, but a sufficiently long and consistent series on
GDP deflator is lacking for this set of countries.
Figure 1 plots the data in real terms. Gt and Rt are both trending. They also show
seasonality, for which we account in the estimation stage. Greece, Ireland and Italy
show sustained periods of close proximity as well as periods of divergence between
Gt and Rt. Greece, in particular, shows growing divergence between Gt and Rt since
1980 which peaks up around mid-1990s. However, following the stringent Maastricht
criteria, Greek government revenue and expenditure have converged in a significant
way by 1997. Italy shows a prolonged period of divergence between Gt and Rt which
started in the early 1970s; however Gt and Rt converge in the late 1990s. Ireland
shows a high level of deficit during 1970s and 1980s, but it has reduced significantly
in the 1990s.  Finally, the Netherlands shows less oscillatory government revenue and
expenditure patterns; however, a blip in 1995 is apparent.
V. Methodology
A number of asymptotically efficient co-integration methods exist in the literature.
However, in view of the relatively shorter sample of Greece and Italy we employ
Dynamic OLS or GLS (DOLS or DGLS) estimators of co-integrating vector (Stock
and Watson, 1993; Saikkonen, 1991), which is shown to perform better in small
samples compared with a range of other asymptotically efficient estimators10. DOLS
is asymptotically equivalent to Johansen’s (1988) maximum-likelihood based
estimator of cointegrating vectors when variables in the system are I(1) and there is a
single cointegrating vector. Indeed, Rt and Gt both appear first order integrated in our
dataset (see section VI). Further, our system is bivariate, so the issue of multi-
cointegration does not arise. Thus, our choice of estimator accurately corresponds to
                                                          
9 In the case of Italy quarterly data on public expenditure is not available for the period 1992(1)-
1994(4). Hence, we extrapolated quarterly figures from annual data by imposing sample average
quarterly weights.
10 In their Monte Carlo investigations Stock and Watson (1993) find DOLS (DGLS) estimators to be
preferable to a range of other estimators especially when sample size is short.
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the dimension of the system and the univariate properties of the data. The DOLS
regression is given by:
0 1
k
t t k t k t
k k
R G Gβ β γ ε
−
=−
= + + ∆ +∑ (4)
where Rt and Gt respectively are government revenue and expenditures as specified in
equation (3). Under the DOLS, the cointegrating regression is augmented by the lead
and lag differences of regressors in order to control for the endogenous feedback and
the nuisance parameters11. If εt is serially correlated then the appropriate estimator is
DGLS; it allows for an autoregressive error under the Feasible Generalised Least
Squares. The βs are the cointegrating parameters. The estimated co-integrating
vector,V
D
, is given by t t 0 1 tV = R  -  - Gβ β
K KK
, and its stationarity can be checked through
any standard unit root test. Tests of various restrictions on the cointegrating
parameters are implemented through Wald tests, which are χ2 distributed. A further
advantage of this estimator is that it can also handle unbalanced regression, i.e. there
is no need for Gt and Rt to be of the same order of integration. A downside however is
that there is no unique method to determine the order of lead and lag. In view of the
data frequency (quarterly) we set a fourth order lead and lag.
Shifts in fiscal regime are assessed through the tests of structural breaks in the co-
integrating relationship between Rt and Gt (Ahmed and Rogers, 1995; Quintos, 1995).
Break dates are identified through the sequential Wald tests (Quintos, 1995). The
auxiliary regression for the stability test is:
0 1 ( )
k
t t k t k t t
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R G G DGβ β γ δ υ
−
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where
Dt  = 1 if t ∈  T1 = (1,..., m)
= 0 if t ∈  T2 = (m+1, ..., T)
and m denotes the time of the breakpoint. The null of structural stability (H0: δ = 0) is
tested by the Wald test which is χ2(1) distributed. In implementing these tests we trim
15% of the initial and final parts of the sample following Andrews (1993). If any of
                                                          
11 Note that the order of difference required for each regressor in generating the lead and lag term
depends on the order of integration of the corresponding regressor. For example, if a regressor is I(2)
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the sequentially computed empirical Wald statistic, over T-2k0 (k0 = trimming
parameter) regressions, is larger than the conventional 5% critical value of χ2(1) then
that signifies the rejection of the null of structural stability.
Our empirical approach is structured as follows. First, we estimate the separate
cointegrating relationship (equation 4), without accounting for any structural break,
over the: (i) pre-oil-price shock, extending up to 1972(4); (ii) pre-Maastricht,
extending up to 1991(4); (iii) full sample, extending up to 1998(4); and test for both
weak and strong form sustainability. These specifications are treated as benchmark
models, which would indicate if fiscal policy in these countries were sustainable
during these distinct sample periods, and help reconcile our results with the existing
ones. Further, they also act as a reference to assess whether sustainability results are
sensitive to structural breaks. We then test for the structural stability of the
cointegrating relationship between Rt and Gt as specified in equation 5 and identify
the break dates endogenously. The long-run effect (total multiplier) of each identified
structural shift on fiscal sustainability is estimated through suitably defined slope
dummies (see below).
VI. Empirical Results
As the first empirical step, we examined the univariate time series properties of Gt and
Rt. Tests reveal both Gt and Rt are unit root processes12. This implies that the
cointegrating regression specified in equation (4) is directly applicable to this data set.
In the estimation stage, we include seasonal dummies in order to account for the
apparent seasonality in the data.  Table 1 presents cointegration results for benchmark
models along with a range of diagnostics. Where DOLS residuals are serially
correlated, we report DGLS estimates. Results show that Gt and Rt are cointegrated in
                                                                                                                                                                     
then the lead and lag terms must be differenced twice (i.e., ∆(∆xt)). For further details see Stock and
Watson (1993).
12 We employed ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) tests in order to
discriminate between stationary versus non-stationary processes. Both tests reveal Gt and Rt as non-
stationary (unit root) processes. Since these results are well established in the literature, we do not
report in order to conserve space; however they are available on request.
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all three samples for Greece13; the slope parameter is significantly different from zero,
but the null of unit elasticity is rejected during the pre-Maastricht and the full sample
but not before the 1980. Thus, Greek government finances appear to be strong form
sustainable prior to 1980s and weak form sustainable in the other two samples.
Diagnostics show that residuals are well behaved, i.e., they are normal, homoscedastic
and serially uncorrelated.
Ireland also shows strong form sustainability during the pre-oil shock period and
weak-form sustainability in the other two samples. The null of unit elasticity is not
rejected in any of the sample period analysed but the hypothesis of cointegration is
maintained only for the pre-1973 period. However, a number of diagnostics appear
problematic which may be attributed to the unaccounted structural breaks. Italy too
shows weak form sustainability in all three periods analysed. The slope parameters are
statistically significant in all cases but reject the null of unit elasticity. Further, Gt and
Rt appear non-cointegrated in all three samples at the conventional (5%) significance
level. Interestingly, residual serial correlation is apparent even under a fourth order
DGLS, which may be attributed to structural breaks. Likewise, the Netherlands shows
weak form sustainability. Gt and Rt appear cointegrated in the full sample and the pre-
Maastricht period but the slope parameters are statistically different from unity.
However, prior to the first-oil-shock, the slope parameter is statistically unity but Gt
and Rt appear non-cointegrated.
To sum up, the general picture is that all four countries’ government finances appear
sustainable irrespective of whether one focuses on the pre-oil-price shock period, pre-
Maastricht period, or the full sample. Thus, all four countries satisfy IBC even
without considering the structural breaks. Our findings are in sharp contrast to those
of Corsetti and Roubini (1991), who reported public finances of these countries as
unsustainable. However, before we dwell further on this set of results we examine the
issue of structural shifts.
                                                          
13 Greek data starts only in 1970(1) therefore the first sample for Greece extends up to 1980(1) rather
than 1972(4) as for the other countries. The choice of this cut-off point is not arbitrary: in 1981 the
Greek government embarked upon a significant fiscal expansion (see Christodoulakis, 1994).
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Figure 2 plots the sequentially computed Wald tests under the null of stable
cointegrating parameters as outlined in equation (5). Sequential tests are carried out
over a period of 1963-92 for Ireland and the Netherlands, 1968-1993 for Italy and
1974-1993 for Greece. This variation in the test period is due to the different sample
size across countries. The plot for Greece shows three clear breaks, which are
significant at 5% or better. These breaks appear to have occurred around 1976, 1980
and 1990. Likewise, four significant episodes of structural breaks are evident for Italy;
two appear in the early and the late of 1970s, one in 1982 followed by a sustained
period of 1986-1990 when all sequential Wald tests are significant.  Ireland also
shows four shifts. They are evident in 1966, 1974, 1982 and 1986-88. The
Netherlands shows four structural shifts as well. They appear in 1971, 1974, 1985,
and 1988-91. Thus, sequential Wald tests show that the cointegrating relationships
between Rt and Gt have been through multiple structural shifts in all four countries
analysed.
Structural breaks cannot fall too close together. We define a period of three years as
the neighbourhood of a break and represent it by a single shift. The exact break date
(point) in a neighbourhood is identified as the one that produces the highest Chi-
square statistic in the sequential tests. Following this criterion, the exact break dates
identified for Greece are 1976(1), 1980(1) and 1990(3); for Ireland they are 1966(2),
1974(1), 1982(3) and 1987(4); for Italy they are 1970(1), 1978(4), 1982(3) and
1988(3); and for the Netherlands they are 1971(4), 1974(4), 1985(2) and 1991(2).
Interestingly, in the majority of cases, the timing of these break dates corresponds to
important economic events in the countries concerned. For Greece, the break of
1976(1) may be related to the aftermath of the first oil shock and the restoration of
Democracy in the country which was accompanied by a number of nationalisations of
loss-making private companies (see Alogoskoufis, 1995). The break of 1980(1)
corresponds to the well-documented fiscal expansion engineered by Greek authorities
in the early 1980s (see Christodoulakis 1994, Alogoskoufis 1995). Finally, the break
of 1990(3) coincides with the introduction of the Greek convergence programmes
aimed at EMU participation (see Arghyrou, 2000).
For Ireland, we could not find an obvious specific event to link the break of 1966(2);
however it may reflect the era of the spectacular Irish macroeconomic performance of
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mid-1960s, which is characterised by low levels of budget deficit (see O’Grada and
O’Rourke, 1996). The break of 1974 reflects Ireland’s expansionary fiscal response to
the first oil shock whereas that of 1982(3) coincides with the policy U-turn taken in
the 1983 budget, which dismissed previous expansionary measures as “populist quick
fixes”. On the other hand, the break of 1987(4) corresponds to further determined
fiscal consolidation measures introduced by the Irish authorities that year (see
Giavazzi and Pagano, 1991).
In Italy, the break of 1970(1) may reflect the effect of the Autunno Caldo (Hot
Autumn) events of 1969 when the Italian authorities, succumbing to the pressure of
the then powerful Italian labour union, took a number of expenditure-increasing
measures (see Rossi and Toniolo, 1996). We could not find an obvious reason for the
break of 1978(4), although it’s timing falls in the aftermath of the first oil price shock
and quite close to the second oil shock. The break of 1982(3) may be related to the
fiscal-discipline-inducing “divorce” between the Italian Central Bank and the Italian
government. This untied the Central Bank from its obligation to buy all Treasury
bonds that Italian government could not sell in the auction market (see Bank of Italy
1982, p. 217). Finally, the break of 1987(4) corresponds to a number of fiscal
stabilisation measures taken by the Italian authorities in the late 1980s, aimed at
ensuring the viability of the Lira’s participation in the narrow-band of the ERM and
achieving the fiscal targets required for EMU participation.
For the Netherlands, we could not find an economic event that could be linked to the
break of 1971(4); however in view of its positive total multiplier (see below) this
break may reflect the Dutch “golden economic years” of 1950-1973 characterised by
a low level of fiscal deficit. The break of 1974(4) clearly coincides with the first oil
shock whereas that of 1985(2) may be linked to the stabilising effect of a number of
fiscal measures introduced by the Dutch authorities in the mid-1980s (see Avan Ark,
de Haan and de Jong, 1996). Finally, the break of 1991 coincides with the signing of
the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the Dutch convergence programmes.
Whether the fiscal sustainability improved or deteriorated following these regime
shifts is an important issue. It is possible that some regime shifts do not necessarily
exert significant long-run effects. We examine this issue by estimating the long run
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effect (total multiplier) of each endogenously identified break on fiscal sustainability.
We define a slope dummy (Dt) for each identified break point such that: Dt  = 0 if t ∈
T1 = (1,..., m-1) and  Dt = Gt if t ∈  T2 = (m, m+1, ..., T), where m denotes the
identified break date. Thus, the slope dummy for each break point takes a value of
zero until the break date (m-1) and all nonzero values thereafter. This structure of
dummy variables picks up the long-run effect of each regime shift and, when jointly
estimated, their significance can be interpreted as indicative of the distinct effect of
each regime shift. Ceteris paribus, a positive coefficient of slope dummy implies a
move towards strong form sustainability because the bubble term rapidly converges to
zero when β≅1 then, when β<1.
Table 2 presents results augmented by these structural shift dummies. For Greece, the
total multiplier associated with the 1976 shift turned out to be insignificant suggesting
that changes in fiscal regime of the mid-1970s did not have a lasting effect. However,
the total multiplier corresponding to the shift of 1980(1) is significantly negative
which indicates deteriorating sustainability; this is consistent with the fiscal expansion
followed by the Greek authorities in 1980s and her worsening government finances
(see Christodoulakis, 1994; Alogoskoufis, 1995). The positive and significant total
multiplier associated with the shift of 1990s is interesting. This suggests that the
convergence programmes, following the Maastrich Treaty, implemented by the Greek
authorities in the 1990s have achieved improvements on Greek government finances.
The null of the overall slope of unity (i.e., H0: β1 +φ1+φ2=1) is not rejected for the pre-
1980 period but they are rejected in the other two samples. For the pre-Maastricht and
the full sample 0<β1+φ1+φ2<1. Further, Gt and Rt are cointegrated in all cases. Thus,
government finances in Greece satisfy strong form sustainability prior to 1980 and
weak form sustainability in the other two periods.
The estimated total multipliers for Ireland suggest that the structural break of the mid-
1960s had a significantly positive effect on government finances, which is consistent
with a period of spectacular growth and low levels of deficit (O’Grada and O’Rourke,
1996). The break of 1974, ascribed to the first oil-price-shock, had a negative effect,
which is again consistent with a priori expectation. The successive regime shifts of
1982 and 1987 appear to have improved the fiscal sustainability of Ireland. This is
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consistent with the Irish divorce with expansionary policy and its concerted efforts to
achieve the Maastricht criterion of 3% deficit level. Irish Gt and Rt are cointegrated
when structural shifts are accounted for. This result is important because the Irish Gt
and Rt were non-cointegrated for the pre-Maastricht and the full samples when
structural shifts were ignored. The overall slope coefficient (i.e., H0: β1+ φ1+ φ2 + φ3 +
φ4 =1) is statistically not different from unity for the pre-oil-shock and the full
samples. The null of unity is rejected for the pre-Maastrich period only. Thus, Irish
government finances appear strong form sustainable during the pre-oil-shock and the
full sample but only weak form sustainable for the pre-Maastrich period.
For Italy, the shift of early 1970 appears to have deteriorated her fiscal sustainability
which is consistent with the effects of Autunno Caldo discussed above. Interestingly,
the structural shifts of 1978(4) and 1982(3) appear insignificant suggesting that they
had no lasting effect on the fiscal status of Italy. However, the shift identified nearer
to the Maastricht treaty shows a significantly positive effect on fiscal sustainability.
Italian Rt and Gt are cointegrated in all but the pre-oil-crisis period. This result is also
interesting in that the benchmark model shows non-cointegration between Rt and Gt
for Italy in all samples. The overall slope coefficient is always statistically
significantly different from zero but less than unity (i.e., 0 < β1+φ1+φ2 < 1). Thus,
Italian government finances always satisfied the weak form sustainability and hence
the IBC.
Finally, for the Netherlands the structural shift of 1971 shows a positive and
significant effect on her fiscal sustainability which is consistent with the so called
“golden years” effect discussed above. However, the break of 1974 had an adverse
effect which is consistent with the fiscal pressure of the first oil-price-shock. The
structural shift of 1985 appears insignificant, but that of 1991, i.e. the one ascribed to
the Maastrict Treaty, appears to have improved the fiscal sustainability. Dutch Rt and
Gt are cointegrated in all samples although the benchmark model had shown non-
cointegration during the pre-oil-shock period. The overall slope coefficient is less than
unity (i.e., 0 < β1+φ1+φ2 < 1). Thus, in the Netherlands, Rt and Gt are cointegrated and
the government finances satisfy weak form sustainability during all three periods
analysed.
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Overall, the majority of endogenously identified structural shifts correspond to
important policy changes in respective economies and most of them produce
anticipated effects on fiscal sustainability. Moreover, the incorporation of structural
breaks in the analysis increases the instances of cointegration between Rt and Gt,
which is clear evidence in favour of a strengthened fiscal sustainability. However,
there are few regime shifts, which had no statistically significant effect on
sustainability.
VII. Summary and conclusions
Corsetti and Roubini (1991) showed, amongst other things, that the government
finances of Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands were unsustainable. All four are
now euro-zone countries and the issue of fiscal sustainability is of paramount
importance. Since 1991 there have been important changes in these economies. They
did satisfy the 3% deficit criteria by the launch of the Euro. Nevertheless sceptics
allege that many euro-zone countries used various ‘fudges’ and ‘creative’ accounting
in achieving the 3% deficit criteria. Besides, the issue of fiscal sustainability is a
different one. As shown above, the satisfaction of the 3% deficit criterion is not
equivalent to the satisfaction of the intertemporal budget constraint, for countries in
deficit at time t must run surpluses in future such that the bubble term (the discounted
debt term) converges to zero in the limit.
In this paper we re-examine the issue of fiscal sustainability in these four countries.
We take forward the analysis by way of new empirical techniques and extended
dataset. The IBC is examined across different samples: (i) the pre-oil-price shock
period, extending up to 1972(4); (ii) the pre-Maastricht period, extending up to
1991(4); and (iii) the full sample, extending up to 1998(4).  This allows us to evaluate
if government finances were sustainable across various distinct periods in the sample.
Corsetti and Roubini (1991) cautioned that their results might be sensitive to
structural shifts, which they were unable to address. We address the issue of multiple
structural shifts while testing the fiscal sustainability. Regime shifts are identified
endogenously.
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Our results are interesting. First, in sharp contrast to Corsetti and Roubini (1991), we
find that government finances in all four countries satisfied the present value criteria
across all sample periods even without considering the structural shifts. Second, over
the last 40 years or so all sample countries have been through multiple structural
shifts. Of the four countries analyzed, three showed as many as four structural shifts
in their fiscal regime. We are able to link the majority of these shifts to important
policy changes in respective countries. We also find that, in most cases, these regime
shifts produced an effect on fiscal sustainability that was pretty much anticipated.
Third, for all sample countries, we find one of the structural breaks either in the late
1980s or the early 1990s, which we ascribe to the Maastrich Treaty. The effect of this
structural shift has been significantly positive for all countries. We interpret this as the
positive effect of the Maastricht’s deficit convergence criteria on the fiscal
sustainability of these countries. Overall, our results corroborate the anticipation of
the European Council that the deficit criteria will have a positive effect on the fiscal
solvency of these economies. Fourth, we find that allowing for structural shifts
increases the instances of cointegration between Rt and Gt. This is a clear indication in
favor of improved fiscal sustainability. Thus, failure of cointegration between Rt and
Gt, reported by some earlier literature, may be attributed to their inability to account
for structural shifts in fiscal regime.
A few words to reconcile our results with those of Corsetti and Roubini are in order.
They implemented a strong form test of sustainability which requires: (i) Gt and Rt be
cointegrated; and (ii) cointegrating vector between them be homogenous of degree
one [1, -1]. However, as shown by Quintos (1995), in its strict sense, IBC holds if
weak form sustainability is satified. We reject strong form sustainability in most
cases, which is consistent with the findings of Corsetti and Roubini. Our results
mainly show weak form sustainability, a sufficient condition in itself to establish that
the government finances of sample countries are consistent with IBC. Since fiscal
deficit levels are capped below 3% of GDP and the euro zone is characterized by a
low real rate of interest, the fear that the rejection of strong form sustainability may
lead to infinite per-capita debt in the long-run appears more conjecture than real.
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APPENDIX
Table 1 - Analysis without breaks
GREECE
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + ut
DGLS full sample
1970(1)-1998(3)
DOLS pre-Maastricht
1970(1)-1991(4)
DOLS pre-1980s
1970(1)-1980(1)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) 0.896 (0.00) 1.110  (0.00) 0.507  (0.12)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 0.708 (0.00) 0.633 (0.00) 0.859 (0.00)
p-value of Wald test, H0: β = 1 0.00** 0.00** 0.60
t-ADF on  tuˆ   (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -3.50 (3)** [-2.888] -2.905(7)* [-2.898] -7.817**  (4) [-2.938]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
L M  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.82 (2) 0.38 0.17
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.69 0.77 0.95
LM F-test for ARCH 0.95 0.73 0.76
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.97 0.56 N/A
Inference Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability Strong form sustainability
IRELAND
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + ut
DGLS full sample
1957(1)-1998(4)
DGLS pre-Maastricht
1957(1)-1991(4)
DGLS pre-oil crisis
1957(1)-1972(4)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) -0.394 (0.40) -0.210 (0.61) -0.626  (0.07)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 1.107 (0.00) 1.049 (0.00) 1.162  (0.00)
p-value of Wald test, H0: β = 1 0.45 0.70 0.14
t-ADF on  tuˆ  (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -2.291 (5) [-2.881] -2.088 (3) [-2.884] -10.412** [-2.917]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
L M  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.10 0.29 0.74
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.00** 0.00** 0.09
LM F-test for ARCH 0.00** 0.03* 0.50
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
Inference Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability Strong form sustainability
Note: *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 1 - Analysis without breaks (continued)
ITALY
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + ut
DGLS full sample
1962(2)-1998(4)
DGLS pre-Maastricht
1962(2)-1991(4)
DGLS pre-oil crisis
1962(2)-1972(4)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) 0.150 (0.04) 0.243 (0.00) 0.463  (0.00)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 0.915 (0.00) 0.853 (0.00) 0.706 (0.00)
p-value of Wald test, H0: β = 1 0.03* 0.00** 0.00**
t-ADF on  tuˆ  (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -1.254 (6) [-2.883] -2.784 (6) [-2.887] -2.276 (3) [-2.938]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
L M  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.00** 0.00** 0.91
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.84 0.81 0.26
LM F-test for ARCH 0.14 0.84 0.44
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.29 0.39 0.67
Inference Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability
THE NETHERLANDS
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + ut
DGLS full sample
1957(1)-1998(4)
DGLS pre-Maastricht
1957(1)-1991(4)
DGLS pre-oil crisis
1957(1)-1972(4)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) 0.793 (0.00) 0.762 (0.00) 0.389  (0.00)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 0.832 (0.00) 0.839 (0.00) 0.928 (0.00)
p-value of Wald test, H0: β = 1 0.00** 0.00** 0.50
t-ADF on  tuˆ  (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -3.814**(5) [-2.880] -3.473** (5) [-2.883] -2.814 (5) [-2.915]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
L M  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.43 0.45 0.35
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.79 0.23 0.92
LM F-test for ARCH 0.30 0.32 0.84
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.52 0.64 0.40
Inference Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability
Note: *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 2 – Analysis with breaks
GREECE
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + φ1  D1 logGt + φ2 D2 logGt +  ut
DOLS full sample:
1970(1)-1998(3)
DOLS pre-Maastricht
1970(1)-1991(4)
DOLS pre-1980s
1970(1)-1980(1)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) 0.769 (0.02) 0.715 (0.00) 0.507  (0.12)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 0.755 (0.00) 0.764 (0.00) 0.859 (0.00)
D1 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ1 = 0, D1=1 in  1980(1)-1998(3) -0.015 (0.03) -0.015 (0.00)
D2 logG (p-value of Wald  test - H0: φ2 = 0, D2=1 in 1990(3)-1998(3) 0.0123(0.05)
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 =  0 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 = 1 0.00** 0.00** 0.60
t-ADF on  tuˆ  (p-value) (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -4.520 (3)** [-2.887] -3.054 (7)* [-2.898] -7.817**  (4) [-2.938]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
LM  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.68 0.62 0.17
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.30 0.82 0.95
LM F-test for ARCH 0.91 0.96 0.76
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.94 0.74 N/A
Inference Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability Strong form sustainability
IRELAND
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + φ1  D1logGt + φ2 D2 logGt + φ3 D3 logGt
 +  φ4 D4 logGt  + ut
DGLS full sample:
1957(1)-1998(4)
DGLS pre-Maastricht
1957(1)-1991(4)
DGLS pre-Maastricht
1957(1)-1972(4)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) 0.090 (0.58) 0.302 (0.01) 0.129 (0.52)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 0.936 (0.00) 0.865 (0.00) 0.894 (0.00)
D1 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ1 = 0, D1=1 in  1966(2)-1997(4) 0.018 (0.00) 0.023 (0.00) 0.020 (0.00)
D2 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ2 = 0, D2=1 in 1974(1)-1997(4) -0.016 (0.00) -0.010 (0.00)
D3 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ3 = 0, D3=1 in 1982(3)-1997(4) 0.0074 (0.05) 0.008 (0.00)
D4 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ4 = 0, D4=1 in 1987(4)-1997(3) 0.029 (0.00) 0.024 (0.00)
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 + φ3 + φ4= 0 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 + φ3 + φ4 = 1 0.59 0.00** 0.18
t-ADF on  tuˆ  (p-value) (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -5.266 (4)**  [-2.880] -5.551 (3)** [-2.883] -3.670 (3)** [-2.911]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
LM  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.47 0.59 0.98
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.19 0.21 0.26
LM F-test for ARCH 0.29 0.08 0.92
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.07 0.02* 0.89
Inference Strong form sustainability Weak form sustainability Strong form sustainability
Notes: *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Estimated equations for Ireland include an intercept dummy equal to 1 for 1966(4), zero otherwise. Its inclusion does not change the nature of the
results but improves on non-normality and heteroscedasticity.
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Table 2  (continued) – Analysis with breaks
ITALY
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + φ1  D1 logGt + φ2 D2 logGt + ut
DOLS full sample:
1962(2)-1998(4)
DOLS pre-Maastrict
1962(2)-1991(4)
DGLS pre-oil crisis
1962(2)-1972(4)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) 0.195 (0.00) 0.163 (0.00) 0.463  (0.00)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 0.912 (0.00) 0.932 (0.00) 0.706 (0.00)
D1 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ1 = 0, D1=1 in  1970(1)-1997(3) -0.038 (0.00) -0.043 (0.00)
D2 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ2 = 0, D2=1 in  1988(3)-1997(3) 0.033 (0.00) 0.021 (0.00)
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 = 0 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 = 1 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
t-ADF on  tuˆ  (p-value) (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -3.777 (3) **  [-2.882] -5.103 (6)** [-2.887] -2.276 (3) [-2.938]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
LM  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.75 0.28 0.91
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.36 0.74 0.26
LM F-test for ARCH 0.93 0.27 0.44
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.28 0.30 0.67
Inference Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability
THE NETHERLANDS
Estimated equation:  log Rt = α + β log Gt + φ1  D1logGt + φ2 D2 logGt +  φ3 D3 logGt + ut
DGLS full sample:
1957(1)-1998(4)
DGLS pre-Maastricth
1957(1)-1991(4)
DOLS pre-oil crisis
1957(1)-1972(4)
α        (p-value of Wald test - H0: α = 0 ) 0.774 (0.00) 0.737 (0.00) 0.452 (0.00)
log G  (p-value of Wald test - H0: β = 0 ) 0.831 (0.00) 0.841 (0.00) 0.910 (0.00)
D1 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ1 = 0, D1=1 in  1971(4)-1997(3) 0.0096 (0.00) 0.0093 (0.00) 0.0090 (0.00)
D2 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ2 = 0, D2=1 in  1974(4)-1997(3) -0.0070 (0.00) -0.0076 (0.00) -
D2 logG (p-value of Wald test - H0: φ3 = 0, D3=1 in 1991(2)-1997(4) 0.0060 (0.00) 0.0081 (0.00) -
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 + φ3 =  0 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
p-value of Wald test, H0: β + φ1  + φ2 + φ3  = 1 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
t-ADF on  tuˆ  (p-value) (Lag Order ) – [5% critical value] -4.894 (5)** [-2.980] -4.515 (5) ** [-2.883] -4.449 (5) ** [-2.913]
Mispecification tests (p-values)
LM  F-test for 4th order autocorrelation 0.60 0.50 0.94
Chi2 BJ test for non-normality 0.37 0.07 0.20
LM F-test for ARCH 0.39 0.87 0.86
White’s Chi2 test for heteroscedasticity 0.15 0.72 0.67
White’s F-test for heteroscedasticity/functional form
RESET F-test for functional form
Inference Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability Weak form sustainability
Notes: *, ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively.  DGLS equations for Italy and the Netherlands have been estimated using fifth order leads and lags to avoid non-normality of residuals. When
fourth order lead and lags are used, results remain qualitatively identical but normality fails.
Figure 1: Real Government Revenue (R) and Expenditure (G) in logs
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